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THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING: ONE 
DECISION TO UNDO THEM ALL 
By, Margaret Angelucci, Amanda Clark, and Susan Matta 
Margaret Angelucci is a shareholder with the firm Asher, Gittler & D’Alba and has been in practice 
since 1994.  Since then, she has worked hard to represent the interests of working people in a variety of 
capacities.  She represents labor unions and individual employees in both the public and private 
sectors.  In the labor context, Ms. Angelucci practice runs the full gamut of the labor-management 
relationship, including training union staff, union organizing drives, contract negotiations, contract 
enforcement, grievances, arbitrations, interest arbitrations and unfair labor practice proceedings.  Ms. 
Angelucci also has represented union pension and health funds in the enforcement of collective 
bargaining agreements. In the context of representing individual employees and classes of employees, 
Ms. Angelucci has handled a wide variety of matters arising from the employee-employer relationship, 
including negotiating employment agreements, severance agreements, internal investigations, 
covenants not to compete, overtime claims, discrimination claims, and enforcement of COBRA and 
ERISA rights. 
Amanda Clark is an associate at Asher, Gittler & D’Alba in the area of labor and employment law and 
was hired in June 2013.  Ms. Clark works with public sector unions, private sector unions, and individual 
employment plaintiffs.  Prior to joining Asher, Gittler & D’Alba as an associate, Ms. Clark clerked for the 
firm for three years.  Ms. Clark received a Bachelor of Science in Politics and Government & 
Scandinavian Studies, Summa Cum Laude, from North Park University.  She received her Juris Doctor 
from IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law where she graduated with a Certificate in Labor and Employment 
Law from The Institute for Law and the Workplace. 
Susan M. Matta is an associate at Carmell Charone, Widmer Moss & Barr.  She received her B.A. from 
Hampshire College and her J.D. from Michigan State University College of Law. Shortly after 
graduating from college, she was accepted into the AFL-CIO Organizing Institute. During that time she 
worked with SEIU 1199 and the United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 951, where she later 
became a staff organizer. Her organizing experience includes working on both NLRB election 
campaigns as well as corporate pressure campaigns. After graduating from law school, Ms. Matta held 
the position of Law Fellow with the Service Employees International Union’s Hospital Accountability 
Project. She then served as the General Counsel for Service Employees International Union, Local 73 for 
nine years. In the course of her work with SEIU, Local 73 she appeared before the Illinois Labor 
Relations Board, the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, the National Labor Relations Board, 
various administrative agencies and court. She was also called on to handle contract negotiations.  Ms. 
Matta joined Carmell Charone Widmer Moss & Barr in September, 2013, where her practice continues 
to focus on the representation of public sector labor unions. 
On January 21, 2014, the United States Supreme Court heard oral argument 
in Harris v. Quinn.[1] The Court is not expected to issued its decision until May or 
June.  Until the decision is issued, public sector labor organizations and right to 
work advocates wait with baited breath.  Each side has a huge stake in this 
fight.  The Court’s decision in this case has the power to so fundamentally change 
public sector collective bargaining that collective bargaining’s very survival may be 
at stake.  As Harvard University Law School Professor Benjamin Sachs said, the 
Court’s decision in Harris goes “to the heart of the legal regimes that are necessary 
to enable unionization.”[2] The Court could simply reaffirm its long-standing 
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precedent regarding public sector fair share agreements which goes back to its 1977 
decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. [3] There is also a distinct 
possibility that the Court could rule all fair share agreements in the public sector 
unconstitutional.  For the right-to-work advocates, such a decision in their favor 
would be the first step to implementing the new realities of Wisconsin and 
Michigan across the entire country. While it may be tempting for public sector 
labor to rest on the precedent of Abood and subsequent case law, a recent Supreme 
Court decision leaves this precedenton perceivably shaky ground. Knox v. Service 
Employees International Union, Local 1000, served a blow to public sector unions’ 
ability to collect fair share fees.[4] In dicta, written by Justice Alito, the Court 
appeared to invite a case challenging the basic constitutionality of fair share 
agreements.[5] That invitation was accepted when the Court 
granted certiorari in Harris v. Quinn. 
I.  THE PRECEDENT 
For almost forty years, Supreme Court precedent has held that fair share 
agreements in public sector collective bargaining are constitutional.  While the 
contours and fine details of the precedent have been refined since 1977, the core 
finding that fair share agreements are constitutional has not been called into 
serious question.  An understanding of this precedent is important to 
understanding what the Court could be poised to do in Harris v. Quinn. 
A.  Abood v. Detroit Board of Education 
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education is the ground on which all cases dealing with 
public sector fair share agreements have been built.  In Abood, public school 
teachers in Detroit challenged the requirement that they pay service fees 
comparable to union dues.[6] The teachers did not support public sector unions 
and objected to union  ideological activity.  The State of Michigan, at the time, had 
legislation that allowed a union and local government to agree that every employee 
represented by the union, as a condition of employment, pay a service fee equal to 
union dues.  However, nothing in the contract “required any teacher to join the 
Union, espouse the cause of unionism, or participate in any other way in Union 
affairs.”[7] The issue before the Court, therefore, was whether the constitutional 
rights of government employees who object to public-sector unions and union 
activities are violated by compulsory service fees.[8] 
For its decision, the Court looked to two private sector cases, Railway Employees 
Deptartment v. Hanson,[9] and International Association of Machinists v. 
Street.[10] Specifically, the Court noted the holding in Hanson, that “the 
requirement for financial support of the collective-bargaining agency by all who 





receive the benefits of its work…does not violate…the First… Amend- 
men(t).”[11] The Court found Congress’ determination when passing the Railway 
Labor Act, that requiring employees who obtain the benefit of union 
representation share its costs promoted peaceful labor relations, was an allowable 
one.[12] In Street, the Court clarified its holding in Hanson.  The Street record 
contained evidence that the nonmembers’ fees were  being used to finance the 
political campaigns of state and federal candidates and promote political and 
economic policy issues, all of which the nonmembers did not support.[13] The 
Court recognized that the case presented “constitutional ‘questions of the utmost 
gravity’ not decided in Hanson.”[14] The Court found that the Railway Labor Act, 
which governed the case, could be construed in a way to avoid the constitutional 
issues presented.[15] Because the Act only allowed expenditures related to the 
union’s function in negotiating and administering the collective bargaining 
agreement and grievance procedures, charges for those services were not an 
issue.[16] However, the Court held that the use of compulsory union dues for 
political purposes violated the Act itself.[17] In so ruling, the Court avoided the 
constitutional question. 
The Court in Abood noted the “great responsibilities” a union has as an exclusive 
bargaining representative.[18] Significant time and money are spent negotiating 
and administering contracts and settling disputes and grievances on behalf of 
employees.  Requiring non-union members to pay a fair share “has been thought 
to distribute fairly the costs of these activities among those who benefit, and it 
counteracts the incentive that employees might otherwise have to become ‘free 
riders’ to refuse to contribute to the union while obtaining the benefits of union 
representation.”[19] While such fair share payments may be thought to interfere 
with an employee’s freedom of association rights, “the judgment clearly made…is 
that such interference as exists is constitutionally justified by the legislative 
assessment of the important contribution of the union shop to the system of labor 
relations established by Congress.”[20] 
Moving from the private to the public sector, the Court in Abood found that the 
“very real differences” between public and private sector bargaining 
representatives “are not such as to work any greater infringement upon the First 
Amendment interests of public employees.”[21] Furthermore, nothing stops the 
public employee from expressing his viewpoint in opposition to the union.[22] The 
Court acknowledged that public employee unions and the employees who disagree 
with them are engaged in political activities because they are attempting to 
influence policy making.[23] However, the Court found that status as a public 
employee “does not raise the ideas and beliefs of public employees onto a higher 
6 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT SPRING 2014 
 
plane than the ideas and beliefs of private employees.”[24] Put simply, the Court 
stated that “differences between public- and private-sector collective bargaining 
simply do not translate into differences in First Amendment Rights.”[25] 
Abood raised an issue not previously addressed in Street or Hanson, the 
constitutionality of the use of nonmembers’ contributions for purposes other than 
collective bargaining.[26] The Court found that requiring public sector employees 
to contribute to the ideological or political causes of the public sector union as a 
condition of holding a job was a violation of the employees’ First Amendment 
freedom of association.[27] The Court was explicit that its holding did not stop a 
union from engaging in political activities, but only that the Constitution required 
that such activities be financially supported only by the dues of employees who do 
not object to such activities and who are not “coerced into doing so against their 
will by the threat of loss of government employment.”[28] Left unresolved by 
the Abood decision was how unions were to classify collective bargaining activities 
and political activities unrelated to collective bargaining; the Court noted that 
these were difficult problems that were not in front of it at the time.[29] 
B.  Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson 
In Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, non-union employees 
challenged the union’s method of calculating their proportionate “fair share” 
amount.[30] The union and school board had entered into a “proportionate share” 
agreement to solve the problem of free riders.[31] The union determined that 95% 
of dues was an appropriate deduction for a “proportionate share,” and that the 
school board would deduct that amount from nonmembers’ 
paychecks.[32] Objecting non-member employees alleged that the Union 
procedure violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and permitted 
the use of their proportionate shares for impermissible purposes.[33] 
The union had measures in place for dissenting non-members to object to their 
proportionate share. After the proportionate share deduction was made, an 
objection could be filed by writing to the union president.[34] The objection would 
then go through a three stage procedure: 1) consideration by the executive 
committee; 2) if the objector disagreed with the committee’s determination, the 
executive board would consider it; and 3) if the objector did not agree with the 
board’s determination, the union president would select an arbitrator.  Should the 
objection be sustained, all nonmembers would receive a deduction in all future 
dues and the objector would receive a rebate.[35] 
The Court found the union’s system constitutionally inadequate.  According to the 
Court, the system contained three fundamental flaws.  First, by only offering a 





rebate, the system did not adequately avoid the risk that dissenters’ fees may be 
used, even temporarily, for impermissible purposes.[36] Second, the reduction of 
dues did not provide nonmembers adequate information about the calculation of 
the proportionate share.[37] The Court stated that while the employee has the 
burden of raising the objection, the union, as the holder of the information, has the 
burden of proving the fee’s validity.[38] Objectors need to be given sufficient 
information regarding the propriety of union fees due to “basic…fairness, as well 
as concern for the First Amendment rights at stake.”[39] Third, the union’s system 
failed to provide a reasonably prompt decision by an impartial decision 
maker.[40] An objecting employee, the Court said is “entitled to have his 
objections addressed in an expeditious, fair, and objective manner.”[41] 
The Court also concluded that an escrow for the amounts reasonably being 
challenged is required, although it does not have to be a 100 percent 
escrow.[42] The take away from the Hudson case, and a key element of 
the Knox case, is what has come to be known as the Hudson notice.  Unions must 
provide an annual accounting of expenditures to allow dissenters to challenge the 
union’s determination of which expenses are chargeable and must inform 
nonmembers of the process for objecting.[43] 
C.  Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association 
The Court addressed the issue of what is chargeable and non-chargeable to 
dissenting nonmembers in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association.[44] Non-
member teachers objected to the union charging them for lobbying and electoral 
politics; bargaining, litigation and other activities not undertaken on behalf of 
members of the bargaining unit; public relations efforts; miscellaneous 
professional activities; meetings and conventions of parent unions and 
preparation for a strike that would have been illegal under Michigan law.[45] In a 
highly divided opinion, the Court put forth a three part test for whether union 
services were chargeable to nonmembers.  To be chargeable, the activity engaged 
in must: (1) be “germane” to collective bargaining activity; (2) be justified by the 
government’s vital policy interest in labor peace and avoiding “free riders;” and (3) 
not significantly add to the burdening of free speech that is inherent in the 
allowance of an agency or union shop.[46] While recognizing that, in the public 
sector, the line between bargaining-related activities and purely ideological 
activities is “somewhat hazier,” the Court drew the line at general public relations 
activities in supporting a particular profession or public employees generally, 
which it held to be not chargeable to objectors.[47] However, the Court found to 
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be chargeable expenditures for lobbying and other political activities for securing 
ratification of collective bargaining agreements.[48] 
II.  THE CURRENT CLIMATE 
On June 21, 2012, the Court issued its opinion in Knox v. Service Employees 
International Union, Local 1000.[49] At issue in Knox was the First Amendment’s 
requirements for special dues assessments not disclosed in the 
yearly Hudson notice.[50] California law allows for a majority of public employees 
to vote to approve an agency shop agreement,[51] and one was involved in 
the Knox case. In June 2005, SEIU sent a Hudson notice, setting monthly dues 
and estimating chargeable expenses at 56.35 percent of its regular dues.[52] After 
the Hudson notice’s 30-day objection period ended, SEIU sent a notice that the fee 
was temporarily increased to fund the union’s engagement in opposing two ballot 
initiatives.[53] The 25 percent increase would be used for an “Emergency 
Temporary Assessment to Build a Political Fight-Back Fund.”[54] One ballot 
measure the union opposed would have required unions to obtain employee 
consent before charging them fees to be used for political purposes.[55] The 
second, would have limited state spending and allowed the Governor, under 
certain circumstances, to reduce appropriations for public-employee 
compensation.[56] Nonmembers were not given the option of opting out of the 
temporary raise in fees.[57] 
The District Court granted summary judgment to the nonmembers for the union’s 
failure  to provide notice of the new assessment.[58] The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed.  The Court of Appeals reasoned that Hudson set forth a 
balancing test with  the proper inquiry being whether the union’s procedures 
accommodated the interests of the union, the employer, and the non-member 
employees.[59] Applying this test, the court concluded that it was not necessary to 
issue a new Hudson notice for midyear assessments. According to the Ninth 
Circuit, the letter sent by the union notifying all employees of the nature and 
purpose of the assessment and charging previous objectors according to the prior 
year’s chargeability percentage properly protected the First Amendment interests 
of all employees.[60] 
The Supreme Court disagreed.  In a seven to two decision, the Court held that a 
new Hudson notice is required for “special union assessments intended solely for 
political and ideological expenditures.”[61] The Court’s opinion did not end 
there.  Five members of the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Alito, held  also 
that any special assessment from that notice can only be levied on those employees 
who opt-in to pay it.[62] “Therefore, when a public-sector union imposes a special 





assessment or dues increase, the union must provide a fresh Hudson notice and 
may not exact any funds from nonmembers without their affirmative 
consent.”[63] 
Justice Sotomayor in a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg joined, 
agreed only that  a new Hudson notice was required.  Justice Sotomayor opined 
that the majority, in the portion of the Court’s opinion requiring opt-in procedures, 
“disregards our rules” and reaches “significant constitutional issues not contained 
in the questions presented, briefed, or argued,” and questions “the validity of our 
precedents, which consistently have recognized that an opt-out system of fee 
collection comports with the Constitution.”[64] A dissent, written by Justice 
Breyer, in which Justice Kagan joined, agreed with Justice Sotomayor.[65] Justice 
Breyer further argued that the approach the union took was “at least one 
reasonably practical way” to protect objecting nonmembers and there was 
insufficient distinction between regular and special assessments to modify the 
basic Hudson notice approach.[66] 
A.  The Implications of Knox 
Knox changes the entire scheme of how public unions are able to collect fair share 
fees from  nonmembers who they represent. Under some circumstances, Unions 
may no longer send Hudson notices giving nonmembers an opportunity to opt out 
of paying for non-chargeable matters but must assume that that bargaining unit 
members will not want to pay full dues.  However, as Justice Sotomayor pointed 
out in her opinion, the scope of the majority’s requirement for an opt-in rather 
than an opt-out approach is unclear.[67] 
[M]ust a union undertaking a special assessment or dues increase obtain affirmative 
consent to collect “any funds” or solely to collect funds for nonchargeable expenses?  May 
a nonmember opt not to contribute to a special assessment, even if the assessment is 
levied to fund uncontestably chargeable activities?  Does the majority’s new rule allow for 
any distinction between nonmembers who had earlier objected to the payment of 
nonchargeable expenses and those who had not? What procedures govern this new world 
of fee collection?[68] 
Justice Breyer’s dissent also raised concerns over the majority’s adoption of the 
opt-in requirement, as “each reason the Court offers in support of its ‘opt-in’ 
conclusion seems in logic to apply, not just to special assessments, but to ordinary 
yearly fee charges as well.”[69] 
While this leaves practical uncertainties for public sector unions, true concern for 
unions and their advocates was raised by dicta contained in the majority’s 
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opinion.  The “most disturbing dicta” of the Knox opinion questions the 
constitutionality of “collective bargaining based on exclusive representation and 
majority rule.”[70] Justice Alito, in his opinion for the Court, stated,: “Our cases to 
date have tolerated this impingement [of compulsory fees on First Amendment 
rights], and we do not revisit today whether the Court’s former cases have given 
adequate recognition to the critical First Amendment rights at stake.”[71] Justice 
Alito called the Court’s acceptance of the free-rider argument “something of an 
anomaly—one that we have found to be justified by the interest in further labor 
peace.  But it is an anomaly nevertheless.”[72] Later in the opinion, Justice Alito 
stated: “By authorizing a union to collect fees from nonmembers and permitting 
the use of an opt-out system for the collection of fees…out prior decisions 
approach, if they do not cross, the limit of what the First Amendment can 
tolerate.”[73] Furthermore, by allowing “unions to collect any fees from 
nonmembers…our cases have substantially impinged upon the First Amendment 
rights of nonmembers.”[74] This language seemed to invite litigation challenging 
the constitutionality of mandatory fair share agreements. 
Exactly what the effect of the Knox ruling is on public sector bargaining is 
unclear.  However, commentators have pointed to Knox and its dicta as a reason 
for unions to be fearful of what the Court’s next term might bring.[75] If nothing 
else, with the granting of certiorari in Harris, Knox serves as a bad omen.  Noting 
the current Court’s anti-labor stance, University of Baltimore law professor Garret 
Epps said, “The Justices remind me a little bit of a crime family in the sense that 
before they whack you, they send you a bullet, they let you know that you’re 
next.  They’ve done that with the labor movement.”[76] 
III.  WHAT IS NEXT? 
It only took one year for the Knox Court’s apparent invitation for a case challenging 
the constitutionality of exclusive bargaining representation and agency shop 
agreements in the public sector to be answered.  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Harris v. Quinn on October 1, 2013, almost two full years after the 
petition for review was filed.  The possible implications of Harris v. Quinn are far 
reaching and very concerning for public sector unions.  The Court could do 
anything from uphold the precedent established in Abood and its progeny, to 
completely strip public sector unions of the financial support they need to 
function.  Even with the outcome unknown, Harris v. Quinn has already disrupted 
public sector bargaining in multiple states as unions, employers and courts await 
the Supreme Court’s decision. 





The petitioners in Harris, home health care workers, originally filed their petition 
for writ of certiorari on November 29, 2011.[77] The case involves two groups of 
home health care workers in Illinois, personal assistants in the rehabilitation and 
disability programs. Personal assistants are individuals who provide household 
assistance, personal care and, with clearance from the client’s physician, certain 
health care procedures for individuals with varying degrees of physical and mental 
disabilities.[78] The personal assistants’ services are provided through two 
Medicaid waiver programs, the Home Service Program and the Home-Based 
Support Program, administered by the Illinois Department of Human Services 
(IDHS).[79] The Home Service Program is referred to as the Rehabilitation 
Program, and IDHS is responsible for funds being administered according to 
applicable laws. The Home Based Support Services program is referred to as the 
Disabilities Program, which assists individuals with mental disabilities and their 
families with in-home care. 
Personal assistants in the Rehabilitation Program received the right to 
representational elections through an Executive Order in 2003.[80] The 2003 
Executive Order not only gave personal care assistants the right to a representation 
election, but also required the state to recognize an exclusive representative of 
personal care assistants in the Rehabilitation Program for purposes of collective 
bargaining over terms and conditions of employment within the State’s control.  A 
majority of the personal assistants in the Rehabilitation Program voted to have 
SEIU, Healthcare Illinois and Indiana (SEIUHCII) represent them.[81] Shortly 
thereafter, the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act was amended to include personal 
assistants in the definition of public employees and to clarify that the duty to 
bargain regarding personal assistants was limited to terms and conditions of 
employment within the State’s control.[82] 
After the election, the State and SEIUHCII negotiated and entered into a collective 
bargaining agreement setting pay rates, creating a health benefit fund for personal 
assistants, a training program, and other provisions typical to collective bargaining 
agreements, such as a union security, or fair share, clause.[83] The fair share 
clause requires “all Personal Assistants who are not members of the Union . . . to 
pay their proportionate share of the costs of the collective bargaining process, 
contract administration and pursuing matters affecting wages, hours and other 
conditions of employment.”[84] 
In 2009, Governor Quinn signed Executive Order 2009-15, which gave personal 
care assistants in the Disabilities Program the right to a representation election 
and required the State to recognize an exclusive representative of personal 
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assistants in the Disabilities Program for purposes of collective bargaining over 
terms and conditions of employment within the State’s control.  SEIU, Local 73 
petitioned for election and AFSCME, Council 31 intervened, but in a mail ballot 
election the majority of personal assistants rejected representation by either 
union.[85] This Executive Order remains in effect, but has not been codified. 
Personal assistants from both groups filed a two count lawsuit against Governor 
Quinn and the three unions. The Rehabilitation Program personal assistants 
claimed the fair share requirements violated their First Amendment rights of free 
speech and association, and the Disability Program assistants claimed they were 
harmed by the threat of an agreement requiring fair share, even though they were 
not, and are not, paying any such fees.[86] 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that personal assistants were employees 
of the State.[87] The court reasoned that even though personal assistants were 
hired by their individual clients, the State still had significant control over aspects 
of their employment.[88] The Seventh Circuit found that “it is not an uncommon 
situation for a single individual to find himself with more than one employer for 
the same job.”[89] Such control was evidenced by the State: (1) setting 
qualifications and evaluating the patient’s choice of personal assistant; (2) having 
the ability to fire individuals who do not meet the state standards; (3) approving 
mandatory service plans that establish job responsibilities and work conditions; 
(4) conducting annual reviews of work performances; and (5) controlling all 
economic aspects of employment.[90] 
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit found that the state’s interest in stabilized labor-
management relations, a touchstone in previous public sector fair share cases, 
applies in any employer-employee relationship, even if all the employees are not 
in the same location.[91] Because the Seventh Circuit found personal assistants to 
be employees of the State, the fair share agreement was held 
constitutional.[92] However, the Seventh Circuit stressed that it’s holding was 
narrow and limited to the finding that “personal assistants in Illinois home-care 
Medicaid waiver program are State employees solely for purposes of Abood.”[93] 
The Seventh Circuit did not reach the merits of the case for the personal care 
assistants in the Disabilities Program.[94] These personal assistants were not, and 
are not, represented by a union, and therefore their claimed violations were merely 
hypothetical.[95] The Seventh Circuit found that there was no certainty that these 
personal assistants would ever organize.[96] Because “the plaintiffs do not allege 
that the mere existence of the executive order violates their rights, only that it 
makes such a violation more likely…the courts cannot judge a hypothetical future 





violation in this case any more than they can judge the validity of a not-yet-enacted 
law,” to do so would be akin to giving an advisory opinion.[97] Therefore, the claim 
was dismissed without prejudice, allowing the plaintiffs to re-file should the 
dispute ripen.[98] 
IV.  THE POSSIBILITIES 
The possible implications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Harris range from 
the unlikely to the terrifying.  The questions presented in Harris are: 
1) May a State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, compel personal care providers to accept and financially support a private 
organization as their exclusive representative to petition to the State for greater 
reimbursements from its Medicaid programs? (2) Did the lower court err in holding that 
the claims of providers of Home Based Support Services Program are not ripe for judicial 
review?[99] 
Public sector collective bargaining being shaken to its core after the Court’s 
decision is a very possible reality that unions and employers should be prepared 
for. 
A.   The Great Hope 
It is possible that the Supreme Court will affirm Abood and its progeny.  This 
would result in the Court affirming the Seventh Circuit’s ruling that personal 
assistants are employees of the State and may be constitutionally subject to a fair 
share agreement. 
This would be the most positive outcome for public sector unions, especially those 
trying to organize home care workers who are funded by the state. Justice Scalia is 
the possible dark horse from the conservative cadre of the Court.  Although 
he  dissented in Lehnert, Justice Scalia did not disagree with the basic premise 
from the Court’s precedent that fair share agreements are 
constitutional.[100] Instead, he disagreed with the three part test the Court came 
up with to determine what was a chargeable expense. 
Justice Scalia recognized that there is a connection in the Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence “between the rights and duties of the union, on the one hand, and 
the nonunion members of the bargaining unit, on the other.”[101] Justice Scalia 
recognized the distinctive position that “free-riding” nonmembers hold, “they are 
free riders whom the law requires the union to carry—indeed, requires the union 
to go out of its way to benefit, even at the expense of its other interests.”[102] 
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Justice Scalia’s argument in the Lehnert dissent seems to directly confront the 
substance of  the dicta in Knox, which, relying on a quotation from Professor Clyde 
Summers, analogized free riding in the absence of fair share agreements 
to  community associations, parent-teacher associations, associations of university 
professors, and medical associations where not all individuals who benefit from an 
activity of the organization are required to pay for that benefit.[103] However, that 
the current Court would have granted certiorari simply to affirm its precedent is 
made even more unlikely by the Summers’ quote among other dicta in Knox.  As 
discussed above, the Court in Knox seemed to invite a challenge to the 
constitutionality of fair share agreements and indicated that it would be open to 
departing from its precedent. 
B.  The Mixed Bag 
The Supreme Court could find that Rehabilitation Program personal assistants, 
and individuals who provide services through similar state programs, are not 
employees of the State.  In ruling in this manner, the Court would avoid the 
constitutional questions, which it has done previously in cases dealing with similar 
issues.[104] The fallout of such a ruling would make these employees incredibly 
difficult to organize.  It would be a blow to not only the unions named in this case, 
but other labor organizations that have found success organizing and winning 
representation elections for home health care and child care workers in other 
states. 
Such effects can already be seen.  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a 
temporary injunction in a representation election for Minnesota in-home child-
care providers.[105] AFSCME is attempting to organize 12,500 in-home child-care 
workers into one of Minnesota’s largest public unions.  The Eighth Circuit granted 
the injunction while waiting for the Supreme Court’s decision on granting 
certiorari in Harris and has maintained the injunction since certiorari was 
granted.[106] The cases in Minnesota have followed a similar path to 
the Harris case.  Minnesota’s governor, Mark Dayton, issued an executive order in 
November of 2011 allowing for a representation election among child-care 
providers.[107] The law was challenged by two home day-care providers who 
alleged it violated their First Amendment rights.[108] The district court in 
Minneapolis dismissed both cases.[109] A separate unit of personal care 
attendants who were organizing under SEIU, continued to move forward with their 
plans for a representation election despite the injunction in the day-care providers’ 
case.[110] 





While dealing a strong blow to unions who have found some success in organizing 
home care workers, a decision limited to these grounds would spare the larger 
public sector labor movement as a whole from the worst possible outcomes. 
C.  Reaching Unlikely Constitutional Grounds 
The Court could overturn the Seventh Circuit’s finding regarding the Disability 
Group’s standing and the ripeness of their claim.  The Court could then issue a 
ruling that Executive Orders, such as those granting rights to representation 
elections to the Rehabilitation and Disability Personal Assistants are 
unconstitutional.  Most likely such a ruling  would rely on the ground that the 
governor was acting in a legislative capacity by issuing the executive order, which, 
in the case of the Disability Program, has not been codified in Illinois. 
Such a ruling would obviously have an impact on public sector unions. Illinois and 
Minnesota have both granted collective bargaining rights to public employees 
through executive orders  Executive orders had also granted collective bargaining 
rights to workers in Missouri and Indiana.[111] 
This ruling seems very unlikely.  The Court is, generally, adamantly opposed to 
deciding cases in which the claims are completely hypothetical and any decision in 
this arena would essentially be an advisory opinion.  Overturning the Seventh 
Circuit and finding the Disability Program claims ripe would set a dangerous 
precedent for the Court.  This would create a slippery slope that the Court would 
not want to start down, as the door would be opened to all manner of hypothetical 
claims. 
D.  The Great Fear 
The questions presented in Harris are relatively narrow and can be addressed by 
any of the three possible outcomes discussed above.  However, the worst case 
scenario for public sector bargaining is that the Supreme Court goes beyond the 
questions presented in the case, and makes a sweeping ruling that would be 
devastating. 
In Knox, over strong dissent, the Court went beyond the questions presented and 
addressed the constitutionality of the opt-in versus opt-out procedures under 
a Hudson notice.  In Harris, the Court could again go beyond the questions 
presented.  Harris may serve as the means by which the Court revisits and 
overturns almost forty years of precedent allowing agency shop agreements.  As 
previously discussed, the dictum in Knox raises the possibility of this 
outcome.  Such a holding would be catastrophic for unions. 
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Practically, such a ruling would make it financially infeasible for unions to continue 
to operate.  While nonmembers would be allowed to no longer pay fair share fees, 
the unions would still be required, by law, to represent these employees.  Free-
ridership “would be not incidental, but calculated, not imposed by circumstances 
but mandated by government decree.”[112] The union would be required “to go 
out of its way to benefit [the free-riders], . . . at the expense of its other 
interests.”[113] 
V.  BE PREPARED 
Unions must be ready for whatever the new reality is 
after Harris. After Knox, unions know that how they collect their fair share fees 
will change in some way.  After Harris, the ruling in Knox may be moot if the Court 
goes to the most extreme measure.  Should that happen, the landscape for public 
sector unions will be bleak, but it is not impossible for them to continue to exist.  In 
order for the unions to continue to operate and represent the interests of public 
sector workers, new strategies will have to be developed. 
Should the Court rule that mandatory fair share fees are unconstitutional, unions 
must be prepared to shift their mode of operations.  The entire country’s public 
sector labor will essentially become right to work.  But some unions have found a 
way to thrive, even in the right to work conditions.  Culinary Workers Local 226, 
out of Las Vegas can be a model that public sector unions can build off of.  Nevada 
has been a right to work state since the 1950s, but Local 226 has found a way to 
thrive, with approximately 60,000 members, around 90 percent of whom pay 
union dues.[114] Most of this success is attributed to the fact that it is a limited 
competition market and the jobs cannot be outsourced.[115] However, the same 
can be said of most government services. 
While Local 226 is a private sector union, and the impact of Harris will be felt in 
the public sector, unions must be flexible and take what lessons they can from 
where the labor movement is finding success.  Harris has the potential to 
completely reform the public sector labor landscape.  Unions and employers must 
be prepared to the new reality that will emerge, whatever it may be. 
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By, Student Editorial Board: 
MARCO BERRIOS, PETER BRIERTON, ALEC HAUSERMANN,  
AND STEPHANIE Ridella 
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee Relations 
Report.  It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public 
employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the 
public employee collective bargaining statutes. 
I.   IELRA DEVELOPMENTS 
A.  Discrimination 
In SIUC Faculty Ass’n, IEA-NEA and Southern Illinois University Carbondale, 30 
PERI ¶ 172 (IELRB 2014), the IELRB affirmed an ALJ decision which found that 
Southern Illinois University Carbondale discriminated to discourage membership 
in an employee organization in violation of sections 14(a)(3) and 14(a)(1) of the 
IELRA when it failed to appoint Marvin Zeman as interim chair of the Math 
Department.  Zeman had served as association president and as chair of its 
grievance committee.  He also served on the association’s bargaining team and had 
assisted other faculty members in opposing decisions of the dean of the university’s 
College of Science.  The IELRB found that his union activity was known to the 
university and the dean of the college. 
When a vacancy in the Math Department’s chairmanship arose, Zeman and 
another faculty member applied to be interim chair.  The department faculty voted 
overwhelmingly to recommend Zeman but the dean selected the other faculty 
member.  The IELRB observed that the other faculty member had openly 
expressed his lack of union sympathies and that the department chair had 
previously expressed hostility to the union in a response to a grievance. 
The university maintained that Zeman was not selected because he lacked recent 
research activity.  The IELRB found this rationale to be a pretext for antiunion 
discrimination.  The ILERB noted that no requirement of recent research activity 
was included in the requirements for permanent department chair.  The Board 
concluded that the dean “seized on the alleged qualification to legitimize his 
opposition to Zeman . . . concealing his true motivation – retaliating against Zeman 
due to his union activity.” 





II.  IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS 
A.  Arbitration 
In SEIU and City of Chicago, No. L-CA-10-070 (IELB Local Panel, 2014), the ILRB 
Local Panel held that Section 8 of the IPLRA, requiring costs of arbitration to be 
split equally between the employer and employee organization, also included the 
costs of cancellation fees paid to arbitrators. 
At issue in the case was whether the city violated sections 10(a)(4) and (1) of the 
IPLRA when it failed to timely schedule arbitrations, and when it refused on two 
occasions to pay half of the cancellation fees to arbitrators.  With regard to fee 
splitting, the city argued that the Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) applied, 
and that cancellation fees should be paid as provided for in the agreement or as 
allocated in the award.  The latter option cannot apply to cancellation fees because 
there is no award.   The ALJ found, and the Local Panel agreed, that where the 
IPLRA and the UAA conflict, the IPLRA prevails pursuant to section 15 of the 
IPLRA. 
The ILRB emphasized that the importance of preserving the appearance of 
neutrality of the arbitrator.  It stated a “clear public policy favoring arbitration 
which would presumably favor that arbitrators get paid for their 
services.”  Allowing one party to pay the fees, or one party insisting upon the other 
party paying those fees and thereby standing in defense of the arbitrator’s right to 
get paid, necessarily taints the appearance of neutrality.  This practice could also 
bias the arbitrator in future dealings with those parties, and jeopardize future 
negotiations. 
While the Local Panel acknowledged that the requirement to split cancellation fees 
could lead to abuse in the form of last minute cancellations, it did not find this 
persuasive for three reasons.  First, each party would still bear half the cost and 
have an incentive against delay.  Second, where an arbitration award ultimately is 
arrived at, these fees can be taken into account when calculating the award.  And 
third, provisions for paying cancellation fees can be negotiated into collective 
bargaining agreements. 
The ILRB determined, however, that the city’s failure to pay its half of the 
cancellation fees did not amount to a violation of section 10(a)(4) of the IPLRA 
because it did not amount to a repudiation of the collective bargaining 
agreement.  Rather, the Local Panel opined, payment and collection of cancellation 
fees should be left to the normal processes for breach of contract. 
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B.   Managerial Employees 
In AFSCME, Council 31 v. State of Illinois, Department of Central Management 
Services, Case No. S-RC-11-074 (ILRB State Panel 2014), the State Panel affirmed 
an ALJ’s finding that an employee of the Department of Central Management 
Services (“CMS”) working at the Illinois Commerce Commission (“ICC”) with the 
title of  Assistant Director Administrative Law Judge was a manager under the 
IPLRA. 
The mission of the ICC is to ensure that utility companies provide those utilities in 
a safe and cost effective way. The ICC balances the needs of the utilities with the 
needs of the consumers. The ICC’s ALJs conduct hearings upon matters that come 
before the ICC. In contested cases, the ALJs make findings, rulings and issue 
proposed orders. Parties file exceptions with the ALJs, who may then issue revised 
orders. The Commission reviews the revised order. The Commission may accept 
the revised order unchanged or make changes, which would constitute the 
Commission’s final order. 
In 2011, as the date of this matter, the ALJs had issued 88 proposed orders, of 
which the Commission entered orders in 81 cases. Seventy-seven of the 81 orders 
were accepted with no changes. The Chief ALJ testified that in his years at the ICC 
he could only recall a few instances that the Commission substantially reversed a 
proposed order. 
In 2011 and the two years prior, the employee spent 70 percent of his time 
performing the work of an ALJ and 30 percent on other duties. In 2011, while 
acting as an ALJ, the employee spent all his time working on a single matter along 
with two subordinate ALJs, both of whom were previously excluded from collective 
bargaining by the ILRB. In that case, the Commission altered the revenue 
requirement approved by the employee, which the chief judge testified was a 
significant change. 
The ILRB, in holding that the employee was managerial, determined that the 
employee engaged in predominantly managerial functions since his function was 
the same as those performed by ALJ IIIs and IVs who were held to be managerial 
in a previous case by applying the standard that an employee is managerial “if the 
responsibilities of [their] job titles encompass the agency’s entire mission, or a 
major component of its mission.” Like the ALJ IIIs and IVs, the employee hears 
cases and renders decisions on a wide verity of issues, which is the main avenue by 
which the ICC performs its statutory objectives. 





Next, the ILRB found that the employee was charged with directing and 
effectuating management directives because his recommendations were effective, 
as evidenced by the acceptance rate of the recommendations by the Commission. 
Additionally, the complexity of the recommendations in rate cases, such as those 
the employee worked on, encompassed dozens of recommendation, most of which 
were accepted by the Commission. Thus, the State Panel found that the employee 
was managerial even though the Commission did not rubber stamp all of the 
employee’s decisions because the Commission accepted the vast majority of the 
employee’s recommendations. 
